Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1981

Neil Jorgensen v. John Clay and Company, a
Corporation, and Aetna Casualty and Surety
Company, a Corporation : Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errorsArthur H. Neilsen; Attorney for Plaintiff-RespondentRichard
Stein and Craig S. Cook; Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Jorgensen v. Clay and Co., No. 17621 (Utah Supreme Court, 1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2604

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NEIL JORGENSEN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 17621

JOHN CLAY AND COMPANY, a
corporation, and AETNA
CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendants-Appellants.
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
;f.

Appeal from the Judgment of the
Sixth Judicial District Court, Sanpete County
Honorable Don v. Tibbs
Richard Stein
Richard Campbell
STEIN & CAMPBELL
2650 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401

Arthur H. Nielsen
Stephen L. Henriod
Clark R. Nielsen
NIELSEN & SENIOR
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Craig s. Cook
3645 East 3100 south
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410!

Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent

Attorneys for DefendantsAppellants
Y...

FILED
AUG 14 1981

---Ci..~

---

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Supremo
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

c-t. . .

.

\{tf\i~~~·-;%

; i'

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

NEIL JORGENSEN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 17621

JOHN CLAY AND COMPANY, a
corporation, and AETNA
CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Appeal from the Judgment of the
Sixth Judicial District Court, Sanpete County
Honorable Don V. Tibbs

Richard Stein
Richard Campbell
STEIN & CAMPBELL
2650 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401

Arthur H. Nielsen
Stephen L. Henriod
Clark R. Nielsen
NIELSEN & SENIOR
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Craig S. Cook
3645 East 3100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent

Attorneys for DefendantsAppellants

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

l

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS .

.

.

3

Ail.GUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO CHANGE
VENUE AND TRIAL TO WEBER COUNTY.

13

POINT II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT VENUE
WAS PROPER, THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN SUBMITTING THE
ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO THE JURY
AND IN SUBSEQUENTLY AWARDING ATTORNEYS'
FEES WHEN THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF
MALICIOUS OR WILLFUL INTENT ON THE
PART OF DEFENDANT JOHN CLAY & CO.

24

POINT III. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT VENUE
WAS PROPER, THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN AWARDING PRE-JUDGMENT
INTEREST AS TO THE AMOUNT RECEIVED FOR THE
REMAINING 6,283 LAMBS.

32

CONCLUSION .

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

36

. ·

CASES CITED
Allred v. Wick Construction Co., 614 P.2d
427 (Utah 1980)
.... · · ·

· • · · · .

27

Atlas Acceptance Corp. v. Pratt, District
Judge, 39 P.2d 710 (Utah 1944)

· · · · · •

17

Bjork v. April Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d
315, 317 (Utah 1977) . . . . ·

• · · · • ·

33

Buckle v. Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co.,
216 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1923)

· · • · • · •

14 I 16 I

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-i-

24

Curtiss v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
560 P.2d 169 (N. M. App. 1976)

27

Dahl v. Prince, 230 P.2d 328 (Utah 1951)

31

DeBry & Hilton Travel Service, Inc. v.
Capitol International Interways, Inc.,
583 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1978)
..... .

2~,

Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427 (Utah 1980)

27

Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980)

26

Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co.,
88 P. 1003 (Utah 1907) . . . . . . . . . • • • • • • • 33
First Security Bank v. Utah Turkey
Growers, Inc., 610 P.2d 329 (Utah 1980)

27

Floor v. Mitchell, 41 P.2d 281 (Utah 1935)

17,

Holdaway v. Hall, 505 P.2d 295 (Utah 1973)

26

Z. D. Howard Co. v. Cartwright, 537 P.2d 345
(Okla. 1975)

27

...•...........

26

Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 359 (Utah 1975)

Lyman Grazing Assn. v. Smith, 473 P.2d 905
(Utah 1970). . . . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Mooney v. Denver & Rio Grande Railway Co.,
221 P. 2d 628 (Utah 1949) . . . . . . . .

15

Nash v. Craigco, Inc., 585 P.2d 775 (Utah 1978).

26

Olympia Sales Co. v. Long, 604 P.2d 919 (Utah 1979).

22

Palfreyman v. Truman, 142 P.2d 677 (Utah 1943) . . ·

19, ;

Palornbi v. D & C Builders, 542 P.2d 325 (Utah 1969).

27

Jack B. Parson Construction Co. v. State,
552 P. 2d 107 (Utah 1976) .

33

Simmons v. Hoyt, 167 P.2d 27 (Utah 1946)

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 582 P. 101
(Utah 1978)

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

21

.
.

~

· ·

-iiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

...

34

Terry v. Zions Co-Op Mercantile Institution,
605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1980) . . . .

26 I

Tomen v. Kent Brown Chevrolet Co., 605
P. 2d 944 (Kan. 1980) . . . . . . . .

27

Uintah Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co.,
546 P.2d 885 (Utah 1976) . . . . . . . • .

33

Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Walker, No. 17101
(May 20, 1981 Utah)
......... .

22

western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Marchant,
615 P.2d 423 (Utah 1980) .
. •...

31

31

STATUTES CITED
§§78-13-1 thru 6, U.C.A.

14

§78-13-4, U.C.A.

15, 16, 22

u .c.A.

15, 16, 22

§78-13-7,

-iii-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

NEIL JORGENSEN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 17621

JOHN CLAY AND COMPANY, a
corporation, and AETNA
CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action filed by Plaintiff against Defendant
John Clay & Co. alleging a breach of a contract to supply
sheep.

Plaintiff alleged that he had been damaged in

excess of $160,000 by the failure of defendant John Clay
& Co. to perform under a written contract for the purchase
of approximately 6,000 sheep.

In addition, Plaintiff

sought damages against defendant Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. as a surety on a stock purchase bond.

Finally,

Plaintiff sought attorneys' fees as to both defendants and
punitive damages as to defendant John Clay & Co.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Complaint of Plaintiff was filed in the Sixth
Judicial District Court on July 12, 1979.

(R. 1-4).

On
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September 17, 1979 Defendants filed a .Motion for Change of

1

Venue asking the case be transferred from Sanpete county
to Weber County, the principal place of business of John
Clay & Co.

(R. 11).

After extensive argument in the

district court the Motion for Change of Venue was denied
on November 6, 1979.

(R.

44).

Thereafter, an Answer was filed by Defendant including
a claim that venue had been improperly laid.

(R.

39-41).

In addition, a Counterclaim was filed against the plaintiff
by defendant John Clay & Co. for its loss of commission.
A jury trial was commenced on June 23, 1980 with the
Honorable Don V. Tibbs presiding.

After five days of trial

the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in
the amount of $191,463.40 as general damages and $1.00 as
punitive damages.

(R. 130).

In addition, the jury found

in favor of Plaintiff as to Defendant's Counterclaim,

A

judgment on the verdict was entered by the trial court on
July 8, 1980.

(Tr. 136-137) .

On August 4, 1980 an appeal was filed to this Court
from the judgment on the verdict.

(R.

139).

This court

in Case No. 17228 remitted that appeal to the district
court since the appeal was not from a final judgment because
the question of interest and attorneys' fees had not yet
been resolved.

(R.

154).

After remand, the matter of attorneys' fees an
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d 1·nterest

was submitted to the trial court as a trier of fact.

on

January 27, 1981 the lower court entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and concluded, based upon the
jury verdict, that the actions taken by defendant John Clay

& Co. were malicious, willful and oppressive and therefore
assessed attorneys' fees against Defendant in the sum of
$21,400.00.

In addition, the lower court assessed pre-

judgment interest of $14,822.37.

(R. 195-200).

Defendants then filed a Notice of Appeal in the instant
case from the judgment on the verdict, and from the order
of the lower court awarding interest and attorneys' fees.
(R.

209).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek a reversal of the lower court verdict

and judgment and a retrial of this case in Weber County
on the basis that venue was improperly laid.

In the alter-

native, Defendants seek a remittur in the amount of the
attorneys' fees and pre-judgment interest assessed by the
lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts in this case are basically undisputed with
the exception of several events which transpired concerning
alleged interference by the plaintiff of the contractual
obligations and the custom of the sheep industry concerning
notification of the seller when lambs are to be transported.

-3-
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Since this Court is obligated to view the evidence most
favorably to the jury verdict and to the findings of the
trial court Defendants will principally rely upon the
evidence of the plaintiff throughout this brief.
The plaintiff Neil Jorgensen testified that he was
a resident of Mt. Pleasant, Utah and was engaged in the
livestock business of raising and storing lambs.

(Tr. SO),

He had been doing this for ten years and had been working
with the defendant John Clay

&

Co. for a number of years,

(Tr. 53-56).
John Clay

&

Co. is a Utah corporation with its principa:

place of business in Ogden, Utah.

Its function is to purchas;

lambs from growers and to resell them to packers with the
company receiving a commission for its efforts.

(Tr. 694,

696).

Mr. Leon Sparrow was a lamb buyer for defendant John
Clay

&

Co. who had dealt with the plaintiff for over ten

years prior to the transactions involved in this litigation.
(Tr. 53-54).

In November of 1978 the plaintiff and Mr.

Sparrow entered into a contract whereby John Clay & co.

.

I
I

would purchase 5, 000 lambs at 65 cents per pound at a maximUJU ',

I

"weight stop" of 120 pounds.

(Exhibit 16).

A "weight stop"

is a device used in the industry which puts a weight limitation on each lamb so that any excess weight is not paid
for by the buyer.

(Tr. 63).

There was no dispute as to
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I

this first contract except as to whether 274 lambs subsequently purchased were properly included under the terms
of this contract or should have been included under the
terms of the subsequent 10,000 sheep contract.
The 10,000 sheep contract was entered into between the
parties John Clay & Co. and Plaintiff on December 13, 1978.
(Defendant's Exhibit l; Plaintiff's Exhibit 1).

This agree-

ment, also in writing, called for an additional 10,000 lambs
to be purchased by John Clay & Co. at 70 cents per pound
with no weight stop limitation.
Since this contract will be discussed in detail during
the Argument portion of this brief further elaboration as to
the details is unnecessary at this point except for the fact
that the sheep designated in that contract were pastured
in Blythe, California.

(Tr. 67).

At the end of December in 1978 the plaintiff called
Leon Sparrow and informed him that because of severe weather
conditions in Blythe, California causing an inadequacy of
feed, it was necessary for him to move the majority of his
herd if they were to survive.

(Tr. 71, 306).

Sparrow

said he would see if he could find a place to move the lambs
until they were ready for delivery under the contract.

(Tr.

307).

Subsequently, sparrow called the plaintiff and informed
him that a feed yard in Ault, Colorado could accomodate

-5-
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Plaintiff's herd.

(Tr. 71) .

The parties agreed to trans·

port the sheep to the Marvin Weber feed yard in Ault,
Colorado with John Clay

&

Co. paying the additional freight

at the time of final delivery.

(Tr. 73).

This location

was particularly convenient since defendant John Clay
Co. had resold the 10,000 lambs to a packer known as
Monfort of Colorado which had its packing plant within six
miles of the feed yard location.

(Exhibit 17; Tr. 72).

During January of 1979 the plaintiff made arrangements
for the transportation of the 10,000 lambs to the Weber feed
yard.

Simultaneously, he was shipping lambs pursuant to the

65 cent contract from a Cedar City herd and from the Blythe,

California herd as to those lambs which were ready for
slaughter.

(Tr. 76-77).

On or about February 10 the plaintiff received a call
from Sparrow informing him that approximately 2,400 lambs
had been shipped out on February 5, 6 and 7 to the Monfort
Packing Plant and giving Plaintiff various weights and dollar
figures.

(Tr. 77, 321-323).

It was undisputed by the

parties that the plaintiff became very upset upon learning
about this shipment and told Sparrow that the plaintiff
should have been notified as to the shipment date which was
customary in the industry so that he could be there if he
desired.

(Tr. 324).

A dispute developed in the testimony of the witnesses

-6-
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as to whether Plaintiff had agreed that the packer Monfort
could take the sheep at its discretion without notification
to the plaintiff or whether the customary notification had
to be made.

Sparrow stated that he reminded the plaintiff

of the prior agreement upon receiving the phone call but
that Plaintiff kept insisting that he was entitled to
notification.

(Tr. 324).

Plaintiff, on the other hand,

denied that there was ever any agreement that he would
not be notified when the lambs were to be taken.

(Tr. 68).

In any case, it was undisputed that Sparrow agreed
to notify the plaintiff as to the dates of the next shipment.
(Tr. 324).

The plaintiff also called Weber, the feed lot

operator, and told him that the plaintiff would notify
Weber when the lambs were to be shipped.

(Tr. 83).

The

plaintiff also stated that he called Wadlington, the lamb
buyer for the packer Monfort, and told him not to ship the
lambs without the plaintiff being present.

(Tr. 83).

Mr. Weber testified that during that same conversation
Plaintiff told Weber not to ship the lambs out since he
did not feel they weighed enough until the week of February
20th.

(Tr. 426).

Wadlington testified that he received a

call from Plaintiff to the same effect that Plaintiff should
have been notified before shipment and that he did not want
any more lambs of his taken out before February 20th.
591).

(Tr.

Plaintiff denied telling either Weber or Wadlington

-7-
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not to ship the lambs out until February 20th and stated
that he only asked that he be advised as to when the
shipments were to be made.

(Tr. 757).

On the 13th of February the plaintiff made a personal
trip to Colorado with his family to check on the sheep.
As they were driving by the Monfort Packing Plant the plaintiff recognized Wadlington and pulled over and talked to him,
The plaintiff testified that Wadlington apologized for not
notifying the witness about the shipment of lambs and said
he would make sure that the plaintiff would be notified in
the future.

The plaintiff then went to the Weber feeding

lot in Ault, Colorado and saw that the lambs were in good
condition.

(Tr. 86-88).

On February 21 the plaintiff received a call from
Sparrow informing him that the lambs had been taken to the
packing plant for the past several days.

Sparrow told the

plaintiff that 695 lambs had been shipped during the precedir,,
days.

Again, the plaintiff proclaimed that he should have

been notified about the prior shipments and told Sparrow
that it was a poor way to run a business in not notifying
the seller.

(Tr. 89).

Sparrow testified that he did oot

apologize on this occasion for not notifying the plaintiff
since the plaintiff had set his own shipping date and that
it was his own fault for not being there because the plaintif:
knew the lambs were going out the week of the 20th.

-8-
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(Tr. Jkj

lllU1\ediately after talking to Sparrow the plaintiff
called Weber, the feed lot operator, who informed the
plaintiff that according to his records 1,096 sheep had been
shipped out.

(Tr. 89).

Plaintiff then called Wadlington

who confirmed the 695 figure.

(Tr. 90).

The witness called Weber and told him not to ship out
any more sheep until the plaintiff arrived at the feed yard
the next morning.

He illU1lediately made a reservation to

fly to Greeley, Colorado.

(Tr. 90).

On the following

morning, however, because of a blizzard, the plaintiff
was unable to catch the plane and called Weber and told
him to ship the lambs even without the plaintiff being
present.

(Tr. 91, 133).

Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff called the Monfort
Packing Plant and requested the number and weight of the
sheep shipped during the week of February 20.

The secretary

who answered the phone told him that 1,096 sheep had been
sent but told him that she could not give him the weights
of the lambs.

The plaintiff told her that he would contact

the government agency supervising packer houses to obtain
the information if necessary.

(Tr. 94-96).

It is uncontroverted that after the shipment of lambs
during the week of February 20 no further lambs were removed
from the Weber feeding yard pursuant to the 10,000 lamb
contract.

Plaintiff testified that on March 3 he received

-9-
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a call from Sparrow that Defendant could no longer accept
the lambs which were remaining at the feed yard.

Sparrow

told the witness that the packer, Monfort, had refused to
accept any more lambs because of the interference in the
shipping dates caused by the plaintiff.

(Tr. 100,391).

Plaintiff immediately contacted his attorney, Clark Nielsen,
and a letter was sent to defendant John Clay

&

Co. warning

that it would be held accountable for any failure to perform
under the contract.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 6).

Sparrow suggested that he and the plaintiff go to
Colorado and meet with the Monfort people to see if the
matter could be resolved.

Accordingly, the plaintiff and

his son met Sparrow and drove to the Monfort Packing Plant.
When they arrived Bob Quam, the vice president in charge of
lamb procurement for Monfort, was not present.
and returned the following day.

They left

(Tr. 101-102).

At that time Quam stated that there had been too much
interference in the shipment of the lambs and that the
company could not afford to continue under the present
agreement.
the parties.

He said a new deal would have to be made among
(Tr. 332).

Quam also told the plaintiff that

any deal was with John Clay & Co. as far as Monfort was
concerned and not with the plaintiff.

(Tr . 10 3 ) .

Sparrow

and the plaintiff left the meeting with no deal having been
worked out.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The next day Raymond Williams, a co-owner of defendant
John Clay & Co., and Frank Rynders, the manager and
secretary-treasurer of the defendant, arrived in Colorado
to assist in working out the problem.

Upon arrival, a

meeting was held at which time it was decided that Williams
and Rynders should go to the Monfort Packing Plant to see
what could be resolved.

(Tr. 715).

Williams returned from the plant and said that Monfort
was willing to purchase the lambs at 60 cents per pound with
a 120 pound weight stop since the lambs were now heavier than
commercially desirable.

(Tr. 106, 757).

The witness said

that he would not accept this price since had had a contract
with John Clay & Co. and was entitled to receive 70 cents
with no weight limitation.

(Tr. 107).

Subsequently, Mr. Rynders telephoned the plaintiff when
he returned h:Jrre and said that Monfort would agree to pay 63
cents and John Clay would pay 3 more cents making a total of
66 cents with a 120 pound stop.

(Tr. 107, 757).

as to a release was made at that time.

No mention

(Tr. 107).

Plaintiff stated that he told Williams and Rynders
that if they wanted to honor their contract they would have
to call the next morning or otherwise he would sell his
sheep to R. H. Rock co.

(Tr. 108).

When he did not receive

a call from the defendant he entered into a deal with Rock
Co. to sell the remaining 6,283 sheep.

-11-
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•
that as a result of that sale and the failure of Defendant
to proceed with its contract he suffered a loss of $166,5 66 ,::
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 10).

Plaintiff admitted, however, that

had he taken the offer made by defendant Clay
have received substantially more money.

&

Co. he would

(Tr. 140-142),

The above statement of facts is a synopsis of the testi·
mony during the five-day trial.

Additional issues were raise'

at the trial concerning the accuracy of the various records,
the method of shipping the sheep, the custom and practice

o~

notifying the seller when shipment is to be made, and other
issues not germane to the present appeal.

In addition,

Defendants offered evidence that the interference by Plaint::
in the shipment dates of the sheep impaired the ability of
Monfort to schedule its daily kill and allowed the sheep to
become too heavy for commercial acceptance.
The matter was submitted to the jury which obviously
concluded that Plaintiff had not interferred with the performance of the contract and held John Clay

&

Co. liable

for the difference in the price obtained for the remaining
lambs, for the cost of freight to the Colorado area, and for
the difference in price as to 274 sheep between 65 cents a
pound and 70 cents a pound.

The jury returned a verdict of

general damages for $191,463.40.

(Tr. 130).

In addition,

the jury returned a verdict of $1. 00 against Defendant for
casuai'.
It was agreed that defendant Aetna
punitive damages.

-12-
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l·

& Surety Co. was liable up to the extent of its $75,000.00
bond in the event that liability was assessed against John
Clay

&

Co.

After the jury verdict was returned and after remand
from this Court, Judge Tibbs heard argument as to whether
attorneys' fees should be assessed against the defendants
and whether pre-judgment interest should also be assessed.
The lower court entered its own Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and awarded an additional $21,400.00 in
attorneys' fees and $14,822.37 in pre-judgment interest.
(R. 216-220).
It is from the jury verdict and the lower court judgment
that this appeal is now taken.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN REFUSING TO CHANGE VENUE AND TRIAL TO
WEBER COUNTY.
The Complaint in this matter was filed on July 12, 1979
in the Sixth Judicial District Court of Sanpete County.

The

Complaint alleged that Plaintiff was a resident of Sanpete
County and that defendant John Clay & Co. was a corporation
organized under the laws of the State of Utah with its
principal place of business in Ogden, Utah.

(R. 1).

On September 17, 1979 defendant John Clay & Co. moved
for a change of venue based upon the affidavit of Lewis E.
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Harper and upon the attached agreement which was the basis
of Plaintiff's Complaint.

(R. 11-14).

No other responsive

pleading had been filed prior to the Motion for Change of
Venue.

The parties argued this question extensively in the

lower court and on November 6, 1979 the Honorable Don
Tibbs entered an order denying Defendant's motion.

v.

Subse-

quently, an Answer was filed on behalf of defendant John Cla;
&

Co. also raising the question of improper venue.

(R. 40),

The venue laws of Utah have remained substantially

j

I
I

unchanged since Utah became a territory in the late 1800's. ,
This Court has recognized that the failure to transfer venue
when the facts are clear and when properly demanded is a
substantial right and that it is reversible error to deny
such a transfer.
216 P.2d 684, 686

Buckle v. Ogden Furniture

&

Carpet Co.,

(Utah 1923).

The laws of Utah regarding venue are divided into two
distinct classes.

First, those cases mandating transfer

under specific conditions and, second, those cases in which
the discretion of the court is invoked.

In the first class

of case a court must transfer venue in certain actions

i

respecting real property, in actions involving public office:' I
in actions against a county, in actions on written contract
and in certain transitory causes of action.

u.c.A.

through 78-13-6,

See §§78-13-l,

u.c.A.

The second class of venue statute involves discretion

-14-
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in cases where the court believes that an impartial trial
cannot be had, where a change is required because of the
convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice, or
where all parties stipulate such a change should be made.
§78-13-9, U.C.A.

In such cases a great deal of discretion

is left to the trial court.
Railway Co., 221 P.2d 628

Mooney v. Denver & Rio Grande

(Utah 1949).

In the instant case defendant John Clay & Co. moved to
transfer venue to Weber County, its principal place of
business, on the basis of the mandatory provisions of
§78-13-4, U.C.A. and §78-13-7, U.C.A.

These sections

state the following:
78-13-4. Actions on Written Contracts. When
the defendant has contracted in writing to perform
an obligation in a particular county of the state
and resides in another county, an action on such
contract obligation may be commenced in the county
where such obligation is to be performed or in
which the defendant resides.
78-13-7. All Other Actions.
In all other
cases the action must be tried in the county in
which the cause of action arises, or in the county
in which any defendant resides at the cornrnencement
of the action; provided, that if any such defendant
is a corporation, any county in which such corporation has its principal office of place of business
shall be deemed the county in which such corporation
resides within the meaning of this Section.
This Court in a series of decisions beginning in 1923
has interpreted these sections in such a manner that there
can be no doubt that venue in this case was improperly laid.
The foundational case concerning this type of venue

-15-
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problem is Buckle v. Ogden Furniture
684

(Utah 1923).

&

Carpet Co., 216 P.l:

In that case the plaintiff, a resident of

Salt Lake County, brought an action against a resident

of

Weber County for collection of a debt on an oral contract.
After a trial had been held in Salt Lake County and a
verdict rendered in favor of the plaintiff the defendant
appealed.
This Court interpreted the predecessor of the two
above stated sections and concluded that for §78-13-4 (then
§6528) to be applicable there must be a written contract in
effect.

If there is no written contract then §78-13-7

(then §6531) is applicable.

The court noted that in soch

cases it is mandatory to try the action at the residence of
the defendant since the words "where the cause of action
arises" are referrable "to cases not on contracts, because
the venue on actions on contracts, in respect of where they
arise, is disposed of by §6528, as above interpreted."

.!!.

at 686.
This Court stated the policy reasons behind the venue
statutes and why they must be narrowly construed in favor
bringing an action at the residence of the defendant.
Court stated:
Requiring persons sued to defend legal .
actions at places remote from where they reside
exposes them to an expense and disadva~tage
manifestly unjust, and to avoid such mischief
the general modern tendency is to fix the venue

-16-
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o:

This

of transitory actions at the residence of the
defendant.
By giving a sensible and effective
meaning to all the provisions of the statutes
and considering them together, the only
'
rational conclusion is that the Legislature intended
to establish the general right of persons sued to
have the action tried in the county where one of
them resides, and that the action which may be
tried elsewhere are limited and restricted to
those which the statute itself excepts from
the general rule.
Id. at 685-686.
The next case of substance was decided by this Court in
1934.

In Atlas Acceptance Corp. v. Pratt, District Judge,

39 P.2d 710 (Utah 1944) an action was brought by an automobile
dealer against a buyer of an automobile for a balance owing
upon the car.

The contract sued upon was in writing.

The

defendant argued that he was entitled to be sued in his own
county.

The Court agreed and stated:

When an action is brought in a county other
than the county of the defendant's residence, he
is entitled to a change of venue to the county of
his residence, unless the case comes within the
exceptions enumerated in the statute, one of
which is that when the defendant contracted in
writing to perform the obligation in a particular
county of the state and resides in another county.
In such case to bar the defendant from having the
case transferred for trial to the county of his
residence it must expressly or by necessary
implication be made to appear on the face of the
contract itself that the obligation was to be
performed in the county where the action was
brought.
Id. at 285.
(Emphasis in original).
The court went on to define the term "necessary implication"
as so strong a probability of intention that an intention
contrary to that which is imputed cannot be supposed.
Shortly thereafter this Court in Floor v. Mitchell,
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41 P.2d 281 (Utah 1935) affirmed a transfer of venue from
Salt Lake County to Iron County.

The court upheld the

transfer to the defendant's residence.

This Court stated

that in order for a suit to be brought in Salt Lake County
it was necessary for the plaintiff to show that the writte~
contract on its face required performance in Salt Lake City.
This Court stated, "Mere reference to residence or place
of business having no reference to performance is not suffi·
cient."

This Court then stated:

The contract sued upon was for a "Talking
Picture Reproducing Equipment" to be installed
in Parowan, Iron County, Utah. The contract
itself is silent as to where it was made.
Performance as to the executory part of
installation was to be at Parowan. The place
of business of the National Filmphone Corporation is shown to be in Salt Lake City. The
contract is also silent as to the place of payment.
The contract does not expressly state the place
of performance,
nor within the four corners of
the contract is there any reference to place of
performance from which by necessary implication
the place of payment may be determined. With such
situation the only alternative is the defendants
were entitled to have the action brought at or
transferred to the place of their residence.
Id. at 284.
An examination of the contract sued upon in this case
is no different from that mentioned in the
The contract states that John Clay

&

~

case.

Co. "of Ogden, Utah"

and Neil Jorgensen "of Mt. Pleasant, Utah" agree for
$20, 000 down and $. 70 per pound to the purchase and sale
of 10,000 lambs.

It then continues that "the lambs are

-18-
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on pasture in the Blythe, California area.

They are to be

sorted at daylight the morning of delivery, loaded on the
trucks and weighed on the trucks at their scale.

Delivery

to be F.O.B. truck subject to buyer being able to bill
through to destination between the 1st day of January, 1979
and the 15th day of March, 1979."

The contract then contains

the signature of both parties.

An examination of Exhibit 1 shows that it does not
either expressly or by necessary implication appear on
the face of the contract itself that the obligation was to
be performed in Sanpete County.

There is no mention what-

soever in the contract as to where payment would be made.
While the sheep were kept in Blythe, California there is no
indication that this area was deemed as the county of
performance.

Thus, the contract itself is ambiguous since

the buyer is from Ogden, Utah, the seller is from Mt. Pleasant,
Utah, and the sheep are maintained in Blythe, California.
As such, the defendant was entitled to a venue change to
Weber County, its principal place of business.
This contention is further supported by other cases of
this Court.

In Palfreyman v. Truman, 142 P.2d 677 (Utah 1943)

an action was commenced in weber County against the defendant
who had contracted in writing with the plaintiff to pay them
for certain work done as to cement foundations.
dant resided in Utah county.

The defen-

The lower court denied the
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defendant's motion to transfer venue.

Upon appeal, this

Court reversed.
This Court analyzing the facts of that case stated:
The Complaint in the instant case is based
on an alleged failure of defendant to make a proper
accounting and to pay to plaintiff the net proceeds
due him under the contract.
In reading the contract
it appears that no particular place is specified
where the accounting is to take place nor where
the payment is to be made.
If respondent is to
prevail it must be because the necessary implications of the express terms of the contract show
that the accounting or payment are to be made in
Weber County.
As shown above, plaintiff's obligations were
contemplated by the contract to be performed at or
near Ogden, Utah, and an office was to be maintained
at or near the place of construction.
It is from
these two terms that the necessary implications
must stern that the accounting and payment, which
were defendant's obligations, were to take place
in Ogden, Utah.
Id. at 679.
In concluding that the maintenance of an office and the
performance of the work in Ogden, Utah was insufficient to
show or imply the place of performance this Court stated:
Offices are maintained for a variety of
reasons and not every office is a place where
payment or accounting must necessarily be made.
There is nothing on the face of the contract
from which it can be determined where the
separate banking account was to be opened. It
is just as reasonable to infer that said account
was to be opened in a bank located in the county
in which defendant resides or any other place as
it is to infer that it is to be opened in Weber
County. Because the terms of the contract do
not expressly provide the place where defendant
is to perform his obligations and since there is.
nothing in the terms from which it must neces7anlY
be implied that they be performed in any part1culard
place, it follows that the court should have grante
the motion for a change of venue.
Id. at 679.
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The action in Palfreyman was for an accounting of
profit.

The action in the present case was for the loss of

a contract bargain.

In both cases the contracts did not

specify where the accounting or where the payments were to
be made.

Thus, venue is proper in the defendant's county.

The case of Simmons v. Hoyt, 167 P.2d 27 (Utah 1946)
is remarkedly similar to the instant case.

In that case a

note was executed in St. George, Washington County, Utah
between the plaintiff and the defendants.

The note stated

that the plaintiff lender was "of Cedar City, Utah" and
listed "P. 0. St. George, Utah" next to the signature of
the borrowers-defendants.
An action was commenced in Washington County against
defendants who moved to transfer venue to Utah County, the
place of their residence.

The defendants alleged that venue

in Washington County was improper since the note on its face
did not expressly provide for payment in a particular county.
In concluding that the case should be transferred to
Utah County this Court reviewed the previous decisions mentioned above and stated the following:
In the case at bar, however, the implications
that respondent would have us apply is not one
arising out of any necessary intendment of the terms
of the note. At the bottom of the note the following
words appear:
"P. o. St. George, Utah Phone 184."
The only other reference to place is the recitation
of the residence of J. J. Miller, the payee:
"J. J.
Miller of Cedar City, Utah." From neither of t~ese
can it be said, as a factual implication, that it

-21-
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was necessarily intended that performance in a
particular county was within the contemplation
of the parties.
If the place of performance is
of importance to the parties, they will not
leave the evidence of their belief in its
importance to a legal fiction founded upon the acts
of contracting parties generally.
Id. at 28.
(Emphasis added) .
More recently, this Court in Olympia Sales Co. v. Long,
604 P.2d 919

(Utah 1979) reaffirmed the statutory venue sche,,,

and held that a defendant, as a matter of right, was entitlec
to transfer a lawsuit against him to his residence in an
action involving an oral contract.

This Court reviewed the

I

previous cases and cited together with §78-13-7 and §78-13-4, ;
U .C .A. and reaffirmed the previous holdings of this Court
that venue should be transferred to the defendant's residence
unless a clear exception was indicated.
Finally, as recently as May 20 of this year in~
Bank

&

Trust Co. v. Walker, No. 17101 (May 20, 1981 Utah) th: 0 '

Court reversed a change of venue from Salt Lake County to
Cache County when it was established that the contract
itself showed "defendant's contract performance (payment)
was due at the plaintiff's main office in Salt Lake City."
The court concluded that since the plaintiff had the option
of suing in either the defendant's residence or at the
place of performance it was erroneous for the lower court
to trans fer venue from Salt Lake County when that had been
the place of payment and performance.
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!

The preceding cases amply illustrate that the lower
court erred in refusing to initially transfer this matter
from Sanpete County to Weber County.

There is no doubt

that except for Plaintiff having his residence in Sanpete
County there is nothing in the contract even referring to
Sanpete County.

Since Plaintiff is seeking money damages

for an alleged breach of contract in failure to make payment
it is clear that unless the contract specifically provided
where payment was to be made that the general rule allowing
a defendant to be sued in his own county should have prevailed.
In the instant case Defendants maintained that Plaintiff
had unnecessarily interferred with the performance of the
contract by delaying the delivery of the sheep to the packer.
This in turn caused the packer to breach its obligation with
defendant John Clay & Co. in refusing to take any further lambs
because of their excessive weight.

Plaintiff, on the other

hand, maintained that he never delayed any shipments and
only asked to be notified when shipments were to be made so
he could be present.
The jury in this case (in the plaintiff's county) concluded that Plaintiff was telling the correct version of the
story and therefore found fully in favor of Plaintiff's
claim.

Defendant, however, was entitled to have these same

questions submitted to a jury in its own county and, while
the verdict is no doubt supported by the evidence in the

-23-
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record, it would be equally supportable for a jury in Webe·
County to have found the opposite result.
Since defendant John Clay

&

Co. was deprived of a suJ;.

stantial right to trial in Weber County and since it timel;
and consistently moved for removal to the correct county,
it is now proper for this Court,

just as in the initial

Buckle v. Ogden Furniture case, to reverse the existing
judgment and to order a new trial in the proper county.
POINT II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT VENUE WAS PROPER, THE
TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
SUBMITTING THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO
THE JURY AND IN SUBSEQUENTLY AWARDING ATTORNEYS'
FEES WHEN THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF MALICIOUS
OR WILLFUL INTENT ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT
JOHN CLAY & CO.
Plaintiff in his Complaint made the following allegatic:
Said acts and conduct of defendant John Clay
& Co. were willful, malicious and deliberate and
done with the purpose of harrassing and intimidating
plaintiff to accept less than the full amount of the
purchase price for said lambs for which plaintiff
is entitled to recover punitive damages in the sum
of $100, 000 together with attorneys' fees and costs
of this action.
(R. 3).
At the conclusion of the evidence Defendant's counsel
moved to strike any claim for punitive damages on the basis
that there was no evidence justifying such an award and no
evidence of any tortious act causing any wrong justifying
punitive damages.

(Tr. 7 6 4) .

The motion was denied·

addition, defense

counsel objected to the giving of
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In

1

Instruction No. 4 by the court concerning punitive damages
and the submission of the issue to the jury.

(Tr. 769).

The jury verdict found in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants in the amount of $191,463.40 for
general damages and "$1.00" for punitive damages.
The trial court subsequently heard arguments and received
evidence as to the propriety and amount of attorneys' fees
claimed by Plaintiff's lawyers.

In its "Amended Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law" the trial court found that
"the conduct of the defendant John Clay & Co. and its
officers and employees was willful, malicious and oppressive
as found by the jury.

By reason of the willful, malicious

and oppressive conduct of defendant John Clay & Co. and
its officers and directors, plaintiff is entitled to a
reasonable attorneys'_ fee for prosecuting this action."
(Emphasis added) .

(R. 216-217).

The court further found that an attorneys' fee of
$21,400.00 was reasonable which included "the sum of $1,400.00
of costs and expenses incurred for airline and automobile
travel, hotel and motel expense in connection with the
trial and the taking of depositions in Greeley, Colorado."
(R. 217).
Thus, based upon an award of $1.00 in punitive damages
the trial court assessed attorneys' fees and litigation
costs of $21,400.00.

The judgment as to the attorneys' fees,
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litigation costs and to the $1.00 punitive damage cannot be
substantiated in the evidence and must be reversed.
It is the contention of Appellants-Defendants that
the question of punitive damages should never have been
submitted to the jury based upon the evidence adduced at
trial.

This Court on numerous occasions has defined the

purpose and elements of punitive damages.

In one such

instance this Court stated:
In considering the problem of punitive
damages and the arguments thereon, it is well
to have in mind the purpose of punitive damages.
They are:
a punishment of the defendant for
particularly grievous injury caused by conduct
which is not only wrongful, but which is willful
and malicious so that it seems to one's sense
of justice that mere recompense for actual loss
is inadequate and that the plaintiff should
have added compensation; and that the defendant
should suffer some additional penalty for that
character of wrongful conduct; and also that such
a verdict should serve as a wholesome warning
to others not to engage in similar misdoings.
Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 359 (Utah 1975).

I

See also, Holdaway v. Hall, 505 P.2d 295 (Utah 1973); Elkinqt:'.

=--1

v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980).

1.

Punitive damages are frequently awarded in intentional
tort cases or matters involving fraud and deceit.

~, ~'

Terry v. Zions Co-Op Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314
(Utah 198 O) ; Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P. 2d 354 (Utah 1975); and
Nash v. Craigco, Inc., 585 P.2d 775

(Utah 1978).

;
found
If in a contract action, however, t h e con d uc t ~ 5

.

h

to be wrongful in that it is a contravention of t e c
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on tract

I

i

but is not willful or malicious then punitive damages
cannot be awarded.
1980).

Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427

(Utah

It is generally necessary, in a breach of contract

case, to show an underlying tort for punitive damages to
lie.

See Allred v. Wick Construction Co., 614 P.2d 321

(Alaska 1980); Tomen v. Kent Brown Chevrolet Co., 605 P.2d
944 (Kan. 1980); Curtiss v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 560 P.2d
169 (N. M. App. 1976);
P. 2d 345

z.

D. Howard Co. v. Cartwright, 537

(Okla. 1975).

This Court has recently held that under the Uniform
Commercial Code all remedies for injuries are to be applied
solely for compensation of actual losses and that no punitive award are permitted.

First Security Bank v. Utah Turkey

Growers, Inc., 610 P.2d 329 (Utah 1980).

In the same vein,

this Court has found that poor workmanship in an aluminum
siding contract did not justify the imposition of punitive
damages and reversed an award given to an aggrieved plaintiff.
Palombi v. D &

c

Builders, 542 P.2d 325 (Utah 1969).

A review of the evidence in this case shows that there
is no justification whatsoever for submitting the question of
punitive damages to the jury.

Since there was no contractual

provision allowing for attorneys' fees, this Court's reversal
of the jury award of $1.00 punitive damages would automatically vacate the finding of the lower court awarding
$21,400.00 in attorneys' fees.

See Lyman Grazing Assn. v.
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Smith, 473 P.2d 905

(Utah 1970); DeBry & Hilton Travel

Service, Inc. v. Capitol International Interways, Inc.,

583 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1978).
Viewing the evidence most favorably to the submission

'1

of punitive damages to the jury reveals the following:
There was evidence showing that the defendant had promised
to notify the plaintiff of the shipments of sheep to the

1

Monfort Packing Plant but failed to do so on several occasiJ
Upon protest about not receiving notification, Plaintiff

1

testified that Defendant's vice president stated he would
take Plaintiff's "God damn lambs whenever he wanted to."
(Tr. 82).
After the packing plant had notified defendant John
Clay & Co. it was not going to receive any further lambs a
meeting was held in Colorado between Mr. Sparrow, Mr. Williar:
and the plaintiff.

Plaintiff testified that Williams told

I

him that he should take his losses and forget about it if he :
wanted to maintain his business relationship with the defenda:·I

(R. 105).
The plaintiff's son, Jeff, testified that during this
meeting Williams appeared to be threatening his father to
sue him or get him in trouble.

(Tr. 255).

He stated that

his father upon being told this replied that the defendants
should go to
were dealing with the wrong men and that they
hell and walked out of the room.

-28-
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i

After a careful review of the transcript in this case,
Defendants are unable to find any other testimony which
even remotely goes to Plaintiff's claim that he was
intimidated or harrassed to accept a lesser amount for
his sheep than was originally agreed.

Instead, both parties

voiced their beliefs as to responsibility and attempted to
compromise the crisis using various suggestions.

Defendants

challenge Plaintiff in his forthcoming brief to produce any
evidence of active intimidation or harrassment.

It is clear,

from the preceding evidence, that such conversation and
assertion of legal rights do not give rise to the type of
conduct punitive damages were intended to prevent.
On the other side of the coin, there is ample evidence
to show the good faith of the defendant John Clay & Co.
It is undisputed that upon learning of Plaintiff's trouble
because of the feed situation in California, the defendant's
aqent Sparrow made all the arrangements to move the sheep to
the Denver feed yard.
After the packer had informed defendant John Clay & Co.
that it refused to take any more sheep, Sparrow arranged for
a meeting in Colorado and attempted to compromise the problem
with the packer's agent Bob Quam.

(Tr. 101-102).

Upon failing

to do so Mr. Williams and Mr. Rynders, both executives in
the defendant's company, also flew to Colorado in an attempt
to work out the problem.

(Tr. 103).
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After being unable to persuade the packer Monfort to
honor its contract with John Clay & Co., Defendant was
able to obtain an additional 3 cent offer per pound from
Monfort and agreed to put in 3 cents itself for a total of

66 cents per pound in order to minimize Plaintiff's
damages.

(Tr. 107).

Even after the plaintiff had rejected the offer of
Defendant for the lambs, Plaintiff called Sparrow to see
if he could help him in finding another buyer for the lambs.
Plaintiff stated that Sparrow said he would help him as mucr. I
as he could.

(Tr. 183-185).

!

Sparrow even told the plaintiff that he should sue
John Clay

&

\

Co. for breaching its contract and that John

Clay would then have to sue Monfort who actually caused
the loss.

(Tr. 339).

The evidence, even assuming Plaintiff's version of the
facts to be correct, unequivocally shows that at most, John
Clay & Co. breached its contract to accept Plaintiff's
sheep at the price of 70 cents per pound with no stop weight
but that it attempted to minimize Plaintiff's losses as

ke'll
much as possible since the cause of such breach was the pac ·

Monfort's failure to honor its contract with defendant John I
Clay

&

Co.

Thus, defendant Clay

&

Co. was caught in the

middle between the packer which refused to take Plaintiff's
lambe and Plaintiff which had 6,000 lambs in a rapidly
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declining market.
It was erroneous for the lower court to submit the
question of punitive damages to the jury.

In spite of

this, however, the jury itself saw no actions justifying
punitive damages as evidenced by the $1.00 award it gave.
The trial court, however, felt justified in awarding over
$24,000 in attorneys' fees and travel costs because of the
finding of this $1.00 award.
Defendant does not dispute that in appropriate cases
of punitive damages, attorneys' fees can be considered as
an element of damages.

DeBry & Hilton Travel, supra.

However, this Court in a similar contract action, has
reversed an award of only $200 attorneys' fees in a case where
there was no basis for an award of punitive damages.
v. Prince, 230 P.2d 328 (Utah 1951).

Dahl

Moreover, this Court

has vacated an award of attorneys' fees in a declaratory
judgment action where the controversy was bona fide and
brought in good faith.

western Casualty & Surety Co. v.

Marchant, 615 P.2d 423 (Utah 1980).

And finally, this Court

has noted that the amount of punitive damages must not be
so grossly excessive and disproportionate to the injury
that the verdict can be said to have been arrived at by
passion or prejudice.

Terry v. ZCMI,

~ra.

Thus, even if it were assumed arguendo that the $1.00
award for punitive damages was proper the subsequent judgment
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of the lower court awarding some $24,000 in attorney's fee,!
and travel costs based upon this $1.00 verdict was so
excessive and unreasonable that the amount alone cannot be
sustained.

Any award of attorneys' fees and expenses must

be based upon the proportion of punitive damages actually
suffered rather than allowing the $1. 00 award to open the
door to any claim and any amount of attorneys' fees and
expenses.
In summary, there is no evidence in this record justify·
ing the submission of punitive damages to the jury and even
the award of $1. 00 should be vacated.

Because the parties

!

did not contractually agree to pay attorneys' fees in this

'

matter the award of attorneys' fees and litigation costs
would then be automatically vacated.

In the alternative,

however, if punitive damages were justified then the amount
of attorneys' fees and litigation expenses should be drastically reduced in proportion to the punitive damages found
by the jury.
POINT III
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT VENUE WAS PROPER, THE
TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
AWARDING PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST AS TO THE
AMOUNT RECEIVED FOR THE REMAINING 6,283 LAMBS.
The lower court entered Findings of Fact awarding 6%
per annum interest from March 24, 1979 to the date of the
jury verdict or a total of $14,822.37.
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Defendant does not dispute that pre-judgment interest
was proper as to that portion of the award made by the jury
regarding freight charges between California and Colorado
and the difference in price between 274 lambs at 65 cents
compared to 70 cents per pound.

In both instances these

amounts were fixed and readily ascertainable.
However, as to that portion of the interest award
regarding the remaining 6,283 lambs and their subsequent sale
the award was erroneous.

This Court has held that for pre-

judgment interest to be awarded two factors must be established.
First, the injury and consequent damages must be complete as
of a date certain prior to trial and cannot be of a continuing
nature; second, the damages must be ascertainable as of a
date certain in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and
known standards of value.

Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co.,

88 P. 1003 (Utah 1907).
This Court has subsequently held that pre-judment
interest can be awarded if "the amount of the loss • • • can
be measured by facts and figures" and "calculated with mathematical accuracy," but may not be awarded if "the amount of
the damages must be ascertained and assessed by the trier
of fact at the trial. "

Bjork v. April Industries, Inc· ,

560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977).

See also Uintah Pipeline Corp.

v. White Superior co., 546 P.2d 885 (Utah 1976); Jack B.
Parson Construction Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 107 (Utah 1976)
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and State Farm Fire

&

Casualty Co., 582 P. 101 (Utah 1978). !

The price paid for the sheep in this case under Exhibi'. I

I

1, the contract of December 13, 1978, depended upon the
average weight of the sheep.

Thus, while it was agreed to

pay 70 cents per pound the total amount depended upon the
curnulati ve weight of the sheep at each time of taking.

It

is undisputed that the amount paid to the plaintiff varied
each time since the weight of the lambs upon each occasion
also varied.
Defendant claimed that because Plaintiff had forbidden I
the shipment of the lambs during two occasions the packer

wa;

forced to take lambs which were heavier than commercially
feasible and that it was for this reason the packer declinec
to take any further lambs.

Had the jury found that Plaintii'

had unduly delayed the shipment of these lambs such finding
would have excused any breach on the part of Defendants or,
in the alternative, would have fixed the damages to the
weight which would have been obtained had Plaintiff not
interferred with the shipping procedure.
The contract in this case allowed the buyer John Clay
&

Co. to take the sheep anytime between January 1, 1979 and

March 15, 1979.

The contract between Clay and Monfort

allowed the same dates.

There was testimony throughout the

trial that when a lamb reaches over 120 pounds it becomes
much more difficult to commercially market because of the
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I

extra fat on the various cuts of meat.

(Tr. 508).

As the

weight goes above 120 pounds the meat becomes increasingly
more difficult to sell and a discount must usually be given
to the purchasers of the meat.
Plaintiff calculated his damages in this case by
totaling the 6,283 sheep and their cumulative weight and
multiplying it by 70 cents.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 10 shows

that Plaintiff "should have received" $607,773.30.

Plaintiff

then subtracted the "amount received" from Rock Co. of
$441,166.60 resulting in a "loss" of $166,566.40.
These figures clearly were not ascertainable until
arrived at by the jury.

As to the "amount should have received"

Defendant argued that it was only liable up to 120 pounds
which would have been the price taken had Plaintiff not
interferred with the contract.

An analysis of the actual

weight of the lambs sold to Rock Co. from March 11 through
March 24 shows that the lowest weight was 131 pounds and the
highest weight was 147 pounds.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 9).

Thus, Defendant was being charged for numerous pounds over
the 120 pound mark which it claimed it was not liable for
because of Plaintiff's interference.

It was a jury question

as to whether Defendant's defense was valid or not.
Likewise, the "amount received" was also not "fixed"
until the jury verdict was decided.

This amount was based

upon a contract with R. H. Rock Livestock based upon a sliding
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scale accoring to the weight of the lambs.
Exhibit 8).

(Plaintiff's

Defendants maintained that this contract was

not the commercially reasonable amount required to mitigate
damages and that, in fact, the offer of Defendants at 66
cents a pound with a 120 pound weight stop would have
produced a greater amount.

(Tr. 107, 141-142).

I t was thu;

necessary for the jury to determine whether this was a
reasonable price to receive for these lambs under the circurnstances then existing.
Because the amount of money due to Plaintiff varied
by the weight of the lambs upon their taking there was no
fixed or ascertainable formula which could be utilized for
the assessment of pre-judgment interest.

It was therefore

erroneous for the lower court to award pre-judgment interest
as to the damages claimed from the breach of the defendant
in failing to purchase the some 6, 000 sheep of Plaintiff.
This matter should therefore be remanded to the lower court
for entry of pre-judgment interest as to the freight and
274 lambs only.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of the venue statutes is to insure the under·
lying policy that a defendant should be tried in his own
county unless there is a specific reason for allowing the
trial elsewhere.

In contract cases it is a simple matter

.
to include in the agreement any exception
to th·is general
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rule

by

merely stating where any suit can be brought.

The

decisions of this Court clearly establish the rule that
absent such a showing on the face of the contract, defendants
are entitled to defend the action in their own county.
The lower court committed prejudicial error in refusing
to transfer venue.
Likewise, while punitive damages can justify attorney
fees, there must be a showing that (1) punitive damages
were justified and (2) that the attorney fees assessed are
proportioned to the punitive actions of the wrongdoer.
Here there was no evidence justifying either punitive
damages or $20,000 attorney fees and $1,400 costs and
expenses.
Finally, pre-judgment interest should only be imposed
when the amount is liquidated and submission to a trier of
fact is unnecessary.

Here, both the amount Defendant was

liable for and the amount Plaintiff finally received were
highly questionable and required a jury determination.

In

such a case pre-judgment interest was improper.
For the preceding reasons, therefore, the judgment
below should be vacated and a new trial ordered.

In the

alternative, the award of punitive damages, attorney fees
and pre-judgment interest should be vacated.
Respectfully submitted,
Richard Stein
Richard Campbell
STEIN & CAMPBELL
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